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Norman v. U.S., 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
Gerald Woodward, 3L, Stetson University College of
Law
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit has upheld a
federal claims court ruling that the actions of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in conditioning the grant of a
permit to impact wetlands on a Corps-approved mitiga-
tion plan was not an unconstitutional taking of the
landowner’s property without compensation. The miti-
gation plan provided for the creation or restoration of
other wetlands on the same site as those that could be
filled under the permit. Approval of the permit had been
sought, and this appeal subsequently commenced, by the
developers of a 2,280-acre property in Reno, Nevada.
Background 
In 1986 the Southmark Corporation purchased a
2,425-acre property in Reno, Nevada called the Double
Diamond Ranch. Southmark intended to develop the
property as commercial and industrial office space.
Toward that end it prepared a master development plan
and submitted it to the Reno City Council for approval.
In early 1987 the city council gave preliminary
approval to the plan and specified a number of condi-
tions for a grant of final approval. One of these was the
requirement for a wetlands delineation approved by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The following year, Don Roger Norman and Roger
William Norman entered into an agreement with
Southmark to purchase a 470-acre portion of the former
Double Diamond Ranch property. The Normans
intended to develop the tract for commercial use in
accordance with Southmark’s master plan. At about the
same time another buyer, Robert Helms, purchased
nearly all of the balance of the former ranch property
from Southmark.
In September of 1988 the Corps issued a wetlands
delineation for the property now substantially owned by
Helms and the Normans. It identified a total of twenty-
eight acres of jurisdictional wetlands on the property.
However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, environmental
groups and the general public uniformly criticized the
delineation as inadequate. The Corps subsequently
revoked it and in 1991 issued a new delineation devel-
oped under revised criteria. The new delineation identi-
fied a total of 230 acres of jurisdictional wetlands.
Three years later Helms went bankrupt and the
Normans purchased his 1,800 acres from the bankrupt-
cy estate. The Normans then developed a new three-
phase master plan that included commercial and resi-
dential development. They applied to the Corps for a
permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act to
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Coastal Conservation Assn. v. Gutierrez, 2005 WL
2850325 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
Jonathan Lew, 2L, Roger Williams University School of
Law
Introduction
The Coastal Conservation Association (CCA) and the
Fishing Rights Alliance (FRA), groups representing the
recreational fishing industry, challenged an interim rule
published by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Commerce (Secretary) in conjunction with the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS, also known as NOAA Fisheries). In consoli-
dated civil actions the plaintiffs sought declaratory
relief, alleging that the defendants’ interim rule was
arbitrary and capricious.1 The industry groups alleged
that there was no finding that red grouper was over-
fished, that the interim rule was overbroad because
there was no determination that sixteen of the seven-
teen grouper species were overfished, that the interim
rule was not based on the best scientific evidence avail-
able, and that the agencies’ environmental assessment
was inadequate.
Interim Rule
Pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council2 develops fishery
management plans. NMFS oversees the Council and
makes the appropriate recommendations to the
Secretary, who then promulgates the regulations to
implement the approved plan. Once the plan has been
approved and implemented it has the force and effect
of law. If the Council fails to act in a timely fashion,
the Secretary is required to prepare a plan, amend-
ment, or proposed regulation. The Secretary can pro-
mulgate short-term interim rules to address emergency
situations.
The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Plan for
Reef Fish Resources was implemented in November
1984. In October 2000 NMFS determined that red
grouper stock was overfished and undergoing overfish-
ing.3 This determination was based on stock assessment
findings of red grouper stock as of 1997. Under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council had one year to submit a plan to
end overfishing. The Gulf Council missed the deadline
so the Secretary submitted a proposed Secretarial
Amendment 1 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management
Plan. Secretarial Amendment 1 imposed bag limits for
recreational anglers, set a total allowable catch, and
established a ten-year rebuilding plan for red grouper. 
A subsequent assessment in 2002 found that even
though red grouper stock was improving and could no
longer be considered overfished, the “red grouper was
not yet at the biomass level capable of producing max-
imum sustainable yield on a continuing basis.”4 On
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The stated purpose of the 
interim rule was to 
“reduce the likelihood that 
overfishing for red grouper 
will occur in 2005.”
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Ex Parte Chemical Waste Management, 2005 WL
3083492 (Ala. Nov. 18, 2005)
Benjamin N. Spruill, 3L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a tax-
payer’s challenge to a revenue ruling issued by
Alabama’s Department of Revenue. The revenue ruling
reassessed the tax structure and fees a landfill operator
was required to pay for disposal of certain hazardous
and non-hazardous waste. 
Background
Operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities are assessed fees for waste received for
disposal. Chemical Waste Management (ChemWaste),
an operator of a facility, was levied $51 per ton for haz-
ardous materials and $21 per ton for non-hazardous
materials pursuant to Alabama Code § 22-30B-2(c)(1).
The statute is enforced by the Alabama Department of
Revenue (Department).
ChemWaste petitioned the Department to reassess
the fee structure because some of the hazardous mater-
ial ChemWaste received was treated at the facility and
rendered non-hazardous. ChemWaste sought a revenue
ruling that would decrease the fees
imposed on this reclassified “decharac-
terized” waste to $21 per ton, instead
of $51 per ton.1 The Department
agreed on this fee reduction and used
the non-hazardous tax rate for the
decharacterized waste. An Alabama
taxpayer, John Nichols, challenged the
Department’s fee reduction and
sought  a  dec l a r a t ion  by  the
Montgomery Circuit Court that the
reduction was a wrongfully granted
tax abatement and should be declared
void. 
Legal Standing
A plaintiff can assert a claim only
when he or she has a “real, tangible,
legal interest in the subject matter of
the lawsuit,…the party has been
injured in fact, and…the injury is to a
legally protected right.”2 Similarly, taxpayer standing
requires that a taxpayer “can demonstrate a probable
increase in his tax burden from the challenged activity”
in order to challenge a tax abatement given to another.3
Nichols asserted a claim in the circuit court alleging
that the Department’s revenue ruling violated Alabama
Code § 22-30B-2(c)(1), which sets fees for the disposal
of hazardous waste. ChemWaste’s motion to dismiss the
charge was denied by the circuit court. ChemWaste then
petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama to review the
lower court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and deter-
mine whether Nichols had standing to bring a claim.
The court agreed with the lower court and found
that Nichols satisfied the elements of standing. First,
the court determined that Nichols was challenging an
unlawful tax abatement, not charging that the
Department has failed to carry out its collection duties.
Under Alabama law a taxpayer has standing to chal-
lenge a tax abatement if the taxpayer can prove that his
taxes will likely increase as a result of the abatement.
However, a taxpayer does not have standing to force the
state to collect taxes owed by a third party. 
Next, the court determined that Nichols’ com-
plaint satisfied the burden of proving an increase in
his taxes. The following language in the complaint was
sufficient to prove the likelihood of injury: “[a]s a tax-
Alabama Court Allows Taxpayer to Challenge Ruling
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June 15, 2004, NMFS published its final rule to imple-
ment Secretarial Amendment 1. 
In March of 2005, the Gulf Council found that red
grouper landings “were likely to exceed recreational tar-
get level” as they had in the previous two years.5 The
Council passed a motion granting NMFS the authority
to make an interim rule “to bring the recreational red
grouper fishing within the target levels in Secretarial
Amendment 1 for the year 2005.”6 The stated purpose
of the interim rule was to “reduce the likelihood that
overfishing for red grouper will occur in 2005.”7 NMFS
published its interim rule in the Federal Register on
July 25, 2005.8 The interim rule reduced the red
grouper bag limit from two fish per person per day to
one fish per person per day, and reduced the aggregate
grouper bag limit from five fish per person to three fish
per person and closed recreational fishing for all
grouper species in the Gulf of Mexico (Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone) for November and December 2005.
Finding of Red Grouper Overfishing
The plaintiffs first challenged the enactment of the
interim rule, alleging that the defendants had made no
finding of overfishing. The court looked to the Admin-
istrative Record that summarized the background of the
interim rule and held in favor of NMFS. The court
found that the Federal Register publication of the inter-
im rule adequately established that the Secretary made
the required finding of overfishing. Even though the
2002 stock assessment found that red grouper was no
longer overfished, the Federal Register noted that the
“Gulf Council had concluded that a reduction in recre-
ational red grouper landings ‘[was] needed to end over-
fishing in 2005.’”9 It fur-
ther stated that NMFS
and the Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Fisheries
had determined that the
temporary rule was nec-
essary to reduce overfish-
ing of red grouper in the
Gulf of Mexico. The
findings were sufficient
for the Secretary to con-
clude that red grouper
was being overfished and
an interim rule should
be promulgated. 
Interim Rule Overbroad
NMFS declared that a
secondary purpose of
the interim rule was “to
evaluate and control the
impact of the red grouper rebuilding plan on other
species.”10 The industry groups sought a declaratory
judgment that the defendants violated the Magnuson-
Stevens Act and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) because the interim rule was too broad; it limit-
ed fishing within all grouper species when the interim
rule was only intended to reduce overfishing of one
species. The Administrative Record only addressed the
overfishing of red grouper, and the court noted that the
“limitation and closure as to other grouper species
[went] beyond the request made by the Gulf Council
to promulgate an interim measure to bring the catch
levels of red grouper into line with the Secretarial
Amendment 1 requirements.”11The court found that
red grouper had consistently been treated as a distinct
stock of fish, and without findings of overfishing as to
other grouper species the extension of the interim rule
could not be upheld.
Best Scientific Evidence
The plaintiffs claimed that the interim rule was invalid
because the defendants did not use the best scientific
evidence available. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires
conservation and management measures to be based
upon the best scientific information available although
Page 4 WATER LOG 2006 VOL. 25:4
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National Comm. for the New River, Inc. v. Federal
Energy Reg. Commn., 2005 WL 3440696 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 16, 2005)
Emily Plett-Miyake, 3L, Vermont Law School
The National Committee for the New River, Inc.
(NCNR), an environmental group, petitioned for
review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
(FERC’s) rejection of seven of its claims that a natural
gas company had failed to comply with conditions
imposed on a pipeline construction project. The Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed NCNR’s
petition, stating that the group lacked standing to chal-
lenge the company’s conduct.
Background
In 2001, the East Tennessee Natural Gas Company
(East Tennessee) petitioned FERC for permission to
extend its natural gas pipeline, based in Tennessee, by
about ninety-four miles, from Virginia to North
Carolina. In 2002, FERC issued East Tennessee a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity
for the proposed extension, known as
the “Patriot Project.” The certificate
was subject to sixty-nine condi-
tions, pursuant to Section 7 of
the Natural Gas Act.1 The
conditions involved a wide
range of issues relating to the
pipeline’s construction, in-
cluding minimization of
project impacts on the
southern population of the
bog turtle, ten-day deadlines
for cleanup after trenches are
backfilled, the filing of certain
documents, including weekly status
reports, with FERC, and terms by which
changes to the project proposal would be
allowed.
NCNR is an environmental group devoted to pro-
tecting the New River, which is located in North
Carolina and southwest Virginia. NCNR has been
involved in fighting the “Patriot Project” proposal since
the initial certification proceedings, including partici-
pation as an intervenor in a losing challenge. NCNR
continued to mount legal challenges against East
Tennessee, and as of the time of this appeal had filed
nearly twenty adversarial pleadings since the certifica-
tion of the project. The particular pleading before the
court here addressed seven of the FERC orders involv-
ing five of the legal issues arising from those pleadings.
The appeal of the orders claimed that East Tennessee
failed to live up to the conditions of certification.
Court Decision
The court discussed each of the appeals of the seven
FERC orders in turn. NCNR’s primary claim, and the
subject of four of the orders and two rehearings, was
that East Tennessee’s route realignments were unautho-
rized because they varied too far from the original route
that FERC had certified.
The court declined to evaluate these claims on their
merits because it found that NCNR lacked standing to
bring the challenge. In making this determination
the court noted that “[a]esthetic and environ-
mental harms may confer Article III stand-
ing if they describe a concrete and par-
ticularized injury in fact that is actu-
al or imminent, causally linked to
the conduct at issue, and redress-
able by the relief requested.”2
The court found that the harms
alleged by the plaintiffs did not
meet this standard. The court
noted that the allegations were
not sufficient and focused “on
the general harms that would
arise” as a result of construction.3
The court said that “NCNR must
demonstrate that its members have suf-
fered, or will suffer, specific environmental
and aesthetic harms as a result of the route realign-
ments themselves.”4 The court found that the affidavits
submitted by NCNR did not explain such a particular-
ized injury. NCNR raised similar issues and showings of
proof in challenges to the initial certification. The court
Vol. 25:4 WATER LOG 2006 Page 5
Conservation Group Finds Itself Up FERC’s
River Without a Paddle
See FERC, page 13
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GrassRoots Recycling Network, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, 429 F.3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
Emily Plett-Miyake, 3L, Vermont Law School 
In November, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia found that GrassRoots
Recycling Network, Inc. (GrassRoots) did not have
standing to seek review of the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) rule allowing the director
of an approved state landfill permitting program to
issue research, development, and demonstration per-
mits, and granting variances from certain criteria set
by the EPA for sanitary landfills.
Background
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)1
established “a comprehensive federal program to regu-
late the handling and disposal of solid waste.”2 There
are two portions of the RCRA that the court considered
in this case. The first is 42 U.S.C. §§ 6943(a)(3) and
6944(a)-(b), which require the EPA to “promulgate reg-
ulations containing criteria for determining which facil-
ities shall be classified as landfills and which shall be
classified as [prohibited] open dumps.”3 States are
responsible for enforcing the minimum criteria
required by the EPA for landfills, and must develop
approved solid waste management plans that provide
for the closing of all “open dumps.” The second rele-
vant portion of RCRA is 42 U.S.C. § 6981(a)(6).
Under this portion of RCRA, the EPA is instructed to
conduct and encourage the coordination of research
and development of new and improved methods of col-
lecting and disposing of solid waste.
With hopes of stimulating new technological devel-
opments and alternative disposal processes for munici-
pal solid waste, the EPA issued the Research,
Development, and Demonstration Rule
(RD&D Rule), allowing the director of an
approved state landfill permitting pro-
gram to issue research, development
and demonstration permits granting
variances from certain EPA criteria.
One of the functions of these per-
mits is to authorize the owner
or operator of a landfill to use
a design that does not con-
form to the usual criteria
for run-on systems, the
requirements for final
cover, and the prohi-
bition on adding liq-
uids.4 The issuance
of these permits is
contingent on the
inclusion in the per-
mit of “terms and conditions at
least as protective as the criteria [for municipal
solid waste land fills] to assure protection of human
health and the environment.”5
The GrassRoots Recycling Network (GrassRoots)
is an activist organization seeking to “eliminate the
See Grassroots, page 12
D.C. Circuit Dumps Dump Case
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City of Oxford, Ga. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 428
F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2005)
Alina Johns, 3L, Stetson University College of Law1
Introduction
In 2004 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
determined that a proposal by the City of Covington,
Georgia (Covington) to renovate the Covington
Municipal Airport complied with the applicable regula-
tions and procedures regarding air quality, environmen-
tal impact, and the historical significance of the nearby
town of Oxford. The City of Oxford (Oxford) peti-
tioned for review of the agency’s decision, raising a
number of objections relating to the project and alleg-
ing that not all proper procedures were followed.
Oxford challenged the agency’s actions on five counts.
Challenge One
First, Oxford asserted that the FAA failed to adequate-
ly consider the environmental impact of the project in
conjunction with two related projects: the widening of
the nearby highway and the construction of a new ter-
minal building. Oxford argued that the proposed air-
port plan would, by necessity, require the widening of
the highway in the future, and that language in the plan
indicated that a new terminal building might be built as
well. Oxford contended that these projects had to be
considered by the FAA alongside the project at issue
when determining its environmental impact.
Under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), federal agencies like the FAA are required to
examine the environmental impact of the projects they
approve. The agency first performs an environmental
assessment to determine if the project will have a sig-
nificant impact on the environment. If there will be a
significant impact the agency must prepare a detailed
environmental impact statement. If not, the agency
issues a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) and
performs no additional research into potential impacts.
The FONSI must explain why further research is
deemed unnecessary. This procedure requires that a
project be considered in conjunction with related past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects so
that the potential cumulative impact will be assessed. 
In response to Oxford’s challenge the court rea-
soned that the possible widening of the highway was
not so foreseeable that it must be considered in con-
junction with this project. Likewise, the fact that poten-
tial construction of a new terminal building was men-
tioned in the plan did not render that particular project
“foreseeable” enough to require a cumulative impacts
analysis. 
Challenge Two
Oxford raised a second objection to the project based
on its impact on air quality. The FONSI was based in
part on the understanding that the county in which the
airport is located is “in attainment” of air quality stan-
dards. This belief turned out to be erroneous. However,
Oxford apparently admitted at some point in the pro-
ceedings that the FAA had reassessed the air quality
impacts (presumably using accurate data; the court does
not elaborate) so the court declared the issue moot.
Challenge Three
Oxford further contended that there was insufficient
oversight by the FAA of the independent contractor
who was hired to complete the environmental assess-
ment. The court determined that oversight is not
required by NEPA regulations, provided that the
agency takes responsibility for the project.
Challenge Four
Oxford argued that the FAA violated the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by approving the
airport renovation plan without adequately considering
the town’s historical properties. (Part of Oxford is listed
on the National Register of Historic Places.) Any
agency seeking to build near a place which is deemed to
have historical significance is required to fill out the
necessary paperwork and provide it to any interested
consulting parties. If no consulting party raises an
objection within thirty days of the papers being provid-
ed, then the project may go forward. If a party makes a
complaint, then the agency must make an attempt to
appease them.
In this case Oxford made such a complaint and
asked for more consultation. The FAA decided not to
hold a meeting to address the town’s issues on the
grounds that further meetings would not be useful. The
court held that since previous meetings had been held
Town Loses Challenge to Airport Plan
Appeals Court Defers to FAA
See City of Oxford, page 11
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impact fifteen of the 230 acres of delineated wetlands on
the property. The permit was granted subject to mitiga-
tion in the form of new wetlands creation.
In 1998 the Normans filed for another 404 permit,
this time seeking permission to impact additional wet-
lands that lay scattered across the property. In 1999, after
considerable negotiation, the Corps of Engineers
approved a second permit that allowed for up to sixty
acres to be filled. The mitigation plan for this permit
included the creation and transfer of 195 acres of new
wetlands but allowed areas designated for storm water
run-off - retention ponds - that were already provided for
in the revised master plan to satisfy a considerable portion
of this requirement. The plan was subsequently imple-
mented through the transfer of approximately 221 acres
of retention ponds and other newly created wetlands to a
non-profit property owners’ association. However, both
before and after the second 404 permit was issued the
Normans had been engaged in selling portions of the
property to third party developers and others. When the
1999 permit was issued the Normans retained ownership
of only 716 acres of the original parcel. 
Lawsuit and Subsequent Appeal
In 1995, following the approval of their first 404 permit
application, the Normans brought suit in the Court of
Federal Claims. The complaint charged that their 1988
purchase agreement with Southmark for 470 acres was
based upon the Corps of Engineers’ 1988 delineation
and that the net increase in jurisdictional wetlands
between the 1988 and 1991 delineations located within
that 470-acre parcel - approximately seventy acres - rep-
resented a taking.
The subsequent procedural history of the suit is
long and tortuous. In 2001 the complaint was amended
to include an illegal exaction claim1 that was eventually
dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction. By
November 2003 the case was finally ready to go to trial.
The Normans then moved to retroactively amend their
complaint to increase the amount of the alleged taking
from seventy acres to 221 acres - the full amount they
had transferred to the property owners’ association. The
motion to amend was granted on the first day of trial.
Following conclusion of the trial the court issued an
opinion and order denying all of the Normans’ takings
claims and dismissing their amended complaint.
The Normans appealed the trial court’s rulings on
their takings claims as well as their illegal exaction claim
to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. Their
appeal essentially argued that the trial court had erred by
failing to consider that the Corps of Engineers’ revocation
of the 1988 delineation and subsequent issuance of the
1991 delineation set into motion a chain of events that
culminated in the taking of the 221 acres nearly ten years
later, thus rendering their takings claims meritorious.
As to the dismissed illegal exaction claim, the
Normans argued that the Corps of Engineers’ 1991
delineation had violated the Energy and Water
Development Appropriations Act of 1992 (EWDA),2
which forbade the expenditure of public funds for delin-
eations using the Corps’ 1989 Wetland Delineation
Manual. Since the 1991 delineation had led, according
to the Normans, “foreseeably and predictably” to the
221-acre mitigation, and since that mitigation consti-
tuted an exaction in return for the Corps’ approval of
the Normans’ second 404 permit application, the exac-
tion occurred in violation of a federal statute, thus
bringing the illegal exaction claim under the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
The Appeals Court’s Analysis
The appeals court noted from the outset of its analysis
that the Normans’ takings claims did not challenge the
government’s legitimate authority to require mitigation
in return for granting approval to impact wetlands or
waters of the U.S. over which the Corps has jurisdiction.
Rather, the Normans’ essential argument was that the
entire sequence of events from the issuance of the first
Corps of Engineers delineation in 1988 to the transfer
of the 221 acres in 1999 should be considered as a sin-
gle event since the 1991 delineation directly and
ineluctably caused them to lose 221 acres of property.
The court found this argument unconvincing. It
pointed out that the appellants did not even acquire the
majority of the 221 acres set aside under the 1999 miti-
gation plan until 1994. The court expressed the opinion
that “[t]he causal relationship between the revocation of
the 1988 Delineation and the appellants’ alleged loss is
simply too attenuated to support the weight the
Normans place on it.”3 This conclusion alone, according
to the court, was sufficient to dispense with the bulk of
the appellants’ takings claims.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to provide a
detailed analysis of the Normans’ arguments - and why
they had to fail. First, the court considered the
Normans’ claim that the 1999 permit constituted a
physical taking because it required the Normans to
transfer title to the 221 acres to a third party. In fact, the
permit did not specifically require such a transfer; it only
required the Normans to record the formation of a
Wetlands Mitigation, from page 1
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“Corps approved funding mechanism for the long term
maintenance of the mitigation and preserve areas.”
Transferring the property to a conservation group or
non-profit property owners’ association was one such
mechanism that the Corps approved. There were other
options available to the Normans; they voluntarily chose
to transfer the property. Thus it was plainly evident to
the court that the transfer could not be the basis for a
successful physical takings claim.
Continuing with its analysis, the court
opined that even if the transfer could be char-
acterized as a physical taking, the Normans’
claim for compensation would fail since the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that a land use
regulation “does not effect a taking if it sub-
stantially advances legitimate state interests
and does not deny an owner economically
viable use of his land” provided that there is an
“essential nexus” between the permit condi-
tion and the legitimate state interest.4 The
appeals court here agreed with the lower court
that  in  thi s  case  “the  publ ic  interes t
served…relate[d] directly to the condition
imposed.”5
Moreover, since the property conveyed
was essentially all earmarked as storm water
run-off storage areas by the Normans’ master
development plan, the transfer of that proper-
ty did not impact its “economically viable use”
to any appreciable degree.6 As to the appel-
lants’ categorical takings claim, the court cited
binding and persuasive precedent that a regu-
latory taking becomes categorical “only if the
owner is deprived of all beneficial use of the
parcel as a whole.”7 Since the trial court had
considered the entire 2,280 acres to constitute
the “parcel as a whole,” and since the
Normans’ appeal had not challenged the trial court’s
analysis on this point, “appellants cannot dispute that
court’s conclusion that the facts here do not sustain a
categorical takings claim.”8
The court considered the Normans’ regulatory tak-
ing claim arguments under the three factor balancing
test provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.9 In Penn Central the
Supreme Court defined these three factors as: “(1) the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with…rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations; (2) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and (3)
the character of the governmental action at issue.”10
Reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact under the def-
erential “clearly erroneous” standard, the appeals court
here found that the trial court was correct in its conclu-
sion that the Normans had a reasonable investment-
backed expectation with respect to only four of the 221
acres in dispute. Moreover, although a takings claim “is
not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after
the effective date of the state-imposed restriction,” the
fact that the Normans were actually and constructively
aware of the restrictions imposed by the 1991 delin-
eation prior to their purchase of the other 1,800 acres of
property made it difficult to show that they had “bought
their property in reliance on a challenged regulatory
scheme.”11 Here too the court found the appellants’
arguments of regulatory taking to be unpersuasive.
Finally, in considering the appellants’ illegal exaction
claim the court found that the lower court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction based on the fact that the EWDA was
merely an appropriations act and that, as such, the sup-
posed exaction could not have been “due to a misappli-
cation” of the statute as required by the controlling case
See Wetlands Mitigation, page 14
Photograph of wetlands courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
Page 10 WATER LOG 2006 VOL. 25:4
“such information may not be exact or totally com-
plete.”12 After reviewing the Administrative Record,
especially Secretarial Amendment 1, the court held in
favor of the defendants because “characterizing a fishery
as overfished is a matter of experience and expertise as
well as scientific evidence.”13 The court gave deference
to the agency’s methods because they were in the best
position to decide what methods to use and there was
no clear error.
Environmental Assessment
Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) “by not
adequately addressing the environmental circumstances
regarding overfishing of red grouper.”14 Again, there is a
link between NEPA and APA. The plaintiffs asserted
that “[b]ecause the environmental assessment was inad-
equate…the interim rule [was] arbitrary, capricious,
contrary to law, and an abuse of agency discretion.”15 In
this situation the court is to make sure that the agency
has taken a “hard look” at the environmental conse-
quences of its action.16 Under NEPA an agency must
prepare an environmental assessment to determine
whether or not an environmental impact statement is
necessary. Here, NMFS considered many studies and
reviewed comments and opinions from members of the
recreational fishing industry before it prepared its envi-
ronmental assessment and issued a finding of no signif-
icant impact. The court held that these measures were
sufficient evidence that NMFS took a “hard look” at
the environmental consequences of its decision.
Conclusion
The District Court upheld the interim rule regarding
red grouper. The methods used to determine that red
grouper is overfished were the best methods available,
and NMFS had sufficient information to determine
that the interim rule would not significantly affect the
environment.
However, the reduction of the aggregate grouper
bag limit and closure for recreational fishing for all
grouper species in the Gulf of Mexico for November
and December 2005 were found to be invalid and
struck down by the court. Therefore, the interim rule is
specific to red grouper and fishermen still have the flex-
ibility to fish for other grouper and reef fish species.
ENDNOTES
1.   The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) adopt-
ed the “arbitrary and capricious” standard set out
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This
standard gives deference to agency decisions by
reviewing for clear error. A regulation will be
found to be arbitrary and capricious “if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise.” Coastal
Conservation Assn. v. Gutierrez, 2005 WL 2850325
at *4 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
2.  The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
manages federal fishery resources off the coasts of
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
3.   The Magnuson-Stevens Act defines the terms
“overfishing” and “overfished” to mean “a rate or
level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capac-
ity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustain-
able yield on a continuing basis.” 16 U.S.C. §
1802(29). Maximum sustainable yield is the
“largest long term average catch or yield that can be
taken from a stock complex under prevailing eco-
logical and environmental conditions.” 50 C.F.R. §
600.310(c)(1).
4.  Coastal Conservation Assn. at *3.
5.  Id. at *4 (quoting Administrative Record).
6.  Id.
7.  Id.
8.  Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf, and South
Atlantic, 70 Fed. Reg. 42485, 42511-42512 (July
25, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 622).
9.  Coastal Conservation Assn. at *6.
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id. at *7.
12. Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dept. of Commerce, 393
F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2004).
13. Coastal Conservation Assn. at *8.
14. Id. at *9.
15. Id.
16. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 546
(11th Cir. 1996).
Red Grouper, from page 4
Vol. 25:4 WATER LOG 2006 Page 11
payer [Nichols] is liable to replenish the public trea-
sury for the tax reduction that was wrongfully granted
to ChemWaste. The tax reduction has resulted in a
probable net increase in [Nichols’] taxes since the
reduction went into effect.”4 With the alleged injury,
the court found that Nichols had standing and
ChemWaste’s motion to dismiss was properly denied
by the lower court. 
Separation of Powers
Arguably, the characterization of the fee reduction as a
tax abatement has expanded the ability of a taxpayer
to challenge the policy and practices of the
Department.  The court granted Nichols standing to
challenge the Department’s interpretation of another’s
tax liability; however, Nichols was not a party to the
revenue ruling and language in the complaint stated
above is not specific.
The dissenting justice explained that because these
challenges will be carried out through the courts, the
judiciary could exercise oversight over the collection of
taxes, a function that is traditionally held by the execu-
tive branch of government. Where there is no actual
injury to another, this judicial review is inappropriate as
an interference into the affairs of the Department, an
agency of the executive branch. 
Conclusion
The extent to which the court’s decision expands tax-
payer standing and operates as a precursor to the dis-
regard of the separation of powers doctrine is
unknown.  However, because the court did not
require a showing of specific facts indicating a likeli-
hood of a tax increase, taxpayers seem able to better
withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of standing
when challenging a tax abatement.
ENDNOTES
1.  Ex Parte Chemical Waste Management, 2005 WL
3083492, at *1 (Ala. Nov. 18, 2005).
2.  Id. at *2.
3.  Id. at *3.
4.  Id. at *5.
Chemical Waste, from page 3
for other complaining parties and since the court must
defer to the agency’s judgment unless it appears to lack
a rational basis, the FAA’s actions were justified and the
project could go forward.
Challenge Five
Oxford asserted that the methodology the FAA utilized
to assess noise impacts was insufficient. The agency
used a day-night average sound level (DNL) of 65 dB
as the standard; noise levels below 65 dB would thus be
acceptable. The 65 dB DNL is
generally considered adequate
for all land uses. However, FAA
regulations allow for a stricter
standard if local conditions
demand one. Oxford argued that
the FAA
should
h a v e
used a
s t r i c t e r
DNL in this
case because of the town’s his-
toric character. The court refused to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency
and rejected Oxford’s plea.
Conclusion
The City of Oxford raised multiple challenges to the
FAA’s approval of the Covington Municipal Airport’s
renovation plan, but the court deferred to the agency’s
judgments and rejected Oxford’s petition for review.
ENDNOTES
1. Water Log editor Josh Clemons contributed addi-
tional material to this article.
City of Oxford, from page 7
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waste of natural and human resources — to achieve
Zero Waste” using “classic activist strategies to achieve
corporate accountability for waste and public policies to
eliminate waste, and to build sustainable communi-
ties.”6 GrassRoots petitioned for the review of the
RD&D rule, claiming that it was beyond the powers of
the EPA to issue, and arguing specifically that in issuing
the rule the EPA “violated the RCRA by delegating to
the States the ‘authority…to implement the [RD&D]
permit process’ and ‘to waive certain national criteria’
for sanitary landfills.”7
Court Decision
The Court of Appeals, reviewing the decision of the
EPA to promulgate the rule, focused on the standing to
sue that is required by Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. The court noted that the “‘irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing’ has three ele-
ments: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redress-
ability.”8 In the situation at hand, the court found that
in order for GrassRoots to have standing to sue on
behalf of its members it must meet the following con-
ditions for associational standing: “(1) at least one of its
members [must] have standing to sue in his own right,
(2) the interests the association seeks to protect are ger-
mane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires that an individual
member of the association participate in the lawsuit.”9
The court also noted that the burden was squarely on
GrassRoots to support each element of its claim to have
standing.
Seeking to meet this burden, GrassRoots submitted
affidavits of two group members describing injuries
they claimed to have suffered as a result of the RD&D
rule. The group members claimed that they would not
have bought their properties had they known that near-
by landfills would be turned into “bioreactors” under
the rule.10
The court rejected these claims of injury, however,
noting that neither “is evidence of the ‘actual or immi-
nent’ injury in fact required for standing to sue.”11
Rather, the future harms alleged by the individuals
were, according to the court, “although by no means
impossible,…neither actual nor imminent but wholly
conjectural.”12
Conclusion
The court, finding that nothing in the record showed
actual or imminent harms or injuries to the plaintiff or
its members by the RD&D rule, held that GrassRoots
did not meet the minimum constitutional requirements
for associational standing. The court accordingly dis-
missed the petition.
ENDNOTES
1.   42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
2.   GrassRoots Recycling Network, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, 429 F.3d 1109, 1110 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
3.   Id.
4.   Id at 1111.
5.   Id.
6.   GrassRoots Recycling Network
<www.grrn.org/general/who.html>.
7.   GrassRoots at 1111.
8.   Id. at 1111-12 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
9.   Id at 1111.
10. A bioreactor is a landfill that “uses liquid in order to
increase the rate of biodegradation.” Id.
11. Id at 1112.
12. Id.
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FERC, from page 5
noted that “our earlier decision permitted the pipeline to
be built, so general harms stemming from construction
[or realignment] of a pipeline do not confer standing for
this lawsuit.”5
NCNR raised four additional issues. The first was
whether East Tennessee’s prior effort to drill under the
New River should have been declared a “failure” under
Condition 22 of the FERC certificate, which would
have allowed East Tennessee to abandon drilling in
favor of a better site.6 The court declared that this con-
dition conferred no right upon NCNR. The court fur-
ther found that the issue was moot, as the pipeline
resulting from the drilling had been in operation for
over two years, and that having succeeded, “the drilling
effort patently was not a failure.”7
The second additional issue was procedural, with
NCNR arguing that it was entitled to service of docu-
ments by East Tennessee after certification. The court
disagreed, and found that NCNR had no such proce-
dural right. As explained by FERC, “its rules do not
require that all parties to a certification be served with
documents after certification is finished.”8 Finding that
there was no procedural right to post-certification ser-
vice, the court ruled that NCNR had no standing to
bring this particular challenge.
The third additional issue was another procedural
claim, in which NCNR
argued that a FERC order
was invalid because it was
not signed by the Director
of the Office of Energy
Projects, but rather by the
Deputy Director. The court
dismissed this claim as frivo-
lous, noting that signing
responsibilities can be dele-
gated to specified officials in
the same office. NCNR
failed to articulate what
interests it believed were at
risk, and the court declined
to believe that such action
was that of a “rogue deputy”
acting surreptitiously against
the Director’s will.9
The final issue raised
was NCNR’s appeal of a
FERC order rejecting the
claim that East Tennessee
failed to consider a particular route alternative. The
court noted that these issues had been raised and settled
in previous appeals, and declined the invitation to look
at them again.
Conclusion
Rejecting all of NCNR’s claims, the court found that
the group lacked standing to bring many of the issues,
and had failed procedurally against others. The court
therefore lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition
for review.
ENDNOTES
1.  15 U.S.C. §717f.
2.  National Comm. for the New River, Inc. v. Federal
Energy Reg. Commn., 2005 WL 3440696 at *2
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)).
3.  Id.
4.  Id.
5.  Id.
6.  Id.
7.  Id.
8.  Id at *3.
9.  Id.
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law.12 The court also observed that invoking federal
claims court jurisdiction in these circumstances was con-
ditioned on a demonstration by the appellants that the
supposed exaction occurred “as a direct result of the
application of” the EWDA, a showing that the Normans
failed to make with sufficient verity.13 Even if the
Normans could have successfully demonstrated that an
illegal exaction had occurred as a direct result of the mis-
application of the EWDA, that statute does not provide,
either directly or by implication, any cause of action for
its violation with a remedy for money damages. 
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit upheld the
Court of Federal Claims ruling that the conditions on
the Normans’ wetlands fill permit did not constitute a
physical, categorical, or regulatory taking of their prop-
erty by the government, and that the Court of Federal
Claims did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
appellant’s claim that the property conveyed constitut-
ed an illegal exaction.
ENDNOTES
1.   An exaction is a “wrongful demand of a reward or
fee for an official service performed in the normal
course of duty.” Black’s Law Dictionary 238 (Bryan
A. Garner ed., pocket ed., West 1996).
2.   Pub. L. No. 102-104 (1991).
3.  Norman v. U.S., 429 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
4.   Id. at 1090 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal
Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987), and Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994)).
5.   Id.
6.   Id. (citing Norman v. U.S., 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 261
(Fed. Cl. 2004)).
7.   Id. (citing cases).
8.   Id.
9.  483 U.S. 104 (1978). Unlike a physical taking, in
which the government takes actual physical control
of property, a regulatory taking is merely a reduction
in the value of a property resulting from a govern-
ment regulation.
10. Id. at 124.
11. Norman, 429 F.3d at 1093 (citing Cienega Gardens
v.U.S., 331 F.3d 1319, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
12. Id. at 1095 (internal citations omitted).
13. Id. at 1096.
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Lagniappe (a little something extra)
Around the Gulf...
The drama of Big Hill Acres, which has been covered in past issues of Water Log, may finally be over. The real
estate developers who sold federally protected wetlands with inadequate septic systems as mobile home lots, along
with the engineer who designed the septic systems, have been sentenced by the U.S. District Court in Gulfport.
Robert J. Lucas and Robbie Lucas Wrigley, the developers, were sentenced to eight years and seven years, three
months, respectively, in federal prison. M.E. Thompson Jr., the engineer, was sentenced to seven years, three
months in federal prison. The defendants are liable for $1.4 million in mitigation costs and over $5 million in
fines. The defendants’ attorney has said they will appeal the decision to the Fifth Circuit and, if necessary, the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council has approved changes in fishing regulations that may allow
Gulf commercial red snapper fishers to ply their trade more efficiently. The new rules would replace the existing
monthly 10-day “derbies” with a year-round fishery with catch limits on individual boat owners. A commercial
fisher would be allowed to sell the unfilled portion of his or her quota to another commercial fisher (but not to a
recreational fisher). Commercial fishers are generally supportive of the changes. A final decision on the rule change
should be made by July 2006.
NOAA has revised Coastal Zone Management Act consistency regulations, primarily relating to energy projects.
The Final Rule was published in the Federal Register on January 5, 2006, and may be viewed at http://coastal-
management.noaa.gov/czm/fedcon_rule2006.html.
The EPA has issued the Draft Handbook for Developing Watershed Plans to Restore and Protect Our Waters to pro-
vide guidance to communities, watershed groups, and governmental agencies. Topics include quantifying existing
pollutant loads, developing estimates of the load reductions needed to meet water quality standards, developing
effective management measures, and tracking the progress of an implemented plan. EPA is accepting comments on
the handbook, which may be downloaded at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/watershed_handbook/.
Mississippi politicians unhappy with the way State Farm has handled their
Hurricane Katrina-related insurance claims have joined the thousands of
other victims who are suing the company. Sen. Trent Lott, who lost his
house in Pascagoula, and Rep. Gene Taylor, who lost his house in Bay St.
Louis, are being represented by Lott’s brother-in-law Dickie Scruggs, who
is well known in Mississippi for his success in suing tobacco companies.
The crux of the lawsuit is whether damage from the storm surge should be
considered flooding, which is not covered under many hurricane insurance
policies.
Former presidents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush helped to raise over $90 million for relief efforts in
response to Hurricane Katrina. A third of the money in the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund is going to colleges and
universities, $20 million is going to religious institutions, and the remaining $40 million will be divided among
the affected states. Alabama will receive $3.2 million, Mississippi $12.2 million, and Louisiana will get the lion’s
share of $24.4 million.
Photograph of Hurricane Katrina courtesy of NOAA
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• • • Upcoming Conferences • • •
•APRIL 2006 •
7th Int. Conference on Urban Drainage Modelling & 4th Int.
Conference on Water Sensitive Urban Design
April 3, 2006, Melbourne, Australia
http://www.icms.com.au/UDMandWSUD
2nd National Water Education Conference - 
From the Waters Edge to the Red Centre
April 18-21, Alice Springs, Northern Territory, Australia
http://www.awa.asn.au/events/educationconf06
•MAY 2006 •
7th International Conference on the Environmental Management
of Enclosed Coastal Seas
May 9-12, 2006, Caen, France
http://www.emecs.org.jp/
Aqua 2006
May 9-13, 2006, Firenze, Italy
http://www.was.org
14th International Conference on Aquatic Invasive Species
May 14-19, 2006, Key Biscayne, FL
http://www.icais.org
Integrated Water Resources Management & Challenges of
Sustainable Development
May 23, 2006, Marrakech, Morocco
http://www.ucam.ac.ma/gire3d
